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COMMUNICATING SCIENCE: TRUST AND THE NEW MEDIA ECOLOGY
Mediated trust in science: concept, measurement and
perspectives for the ‘science of science communication’
Mike S. Schäfer
Trust in science is, to a considerable extent, the outcome of
communication. News and online media in particular are important
mediators of trust in science. So far, however, conceptual works on
mediated trust in science are lacking. Taking a cue from Weingart &
Guenther, this commentary proposes a concept of mediated trust in
science and for its measurement, and shows where it could be used in the
science of science communication.
Abstract
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Introduction I wholeheartedly agree with the premise of Weingart and Guenther’s article:
scholars of science communication should discuss the concept of trust more. Trust
has become a central category for the analysis of modern society, with important
contributions by sociologists [e.g. Giddens, 1990; Luhmann, 2000], political
scientists [Fukuyama, 1995], and economists [e.g. Gambetta, 1988], among others.
Trust is particularly important with regards to science. More than other realms of
society, science is a specialized, expert endeavor difficult to comprehend for
outsiders. Therefore, trust in science is important — both for societies, for which
science produces the best available knowledge for upcoming challenges and
decisions [Fischhoff and Scheufele, 2013, p. 14031], and also for science, which will
always be unable to fully explain itself to outside publics and decision-makers, yet
strongly depends on their support and resources [cf. Weingart, 2005].
And trust in science is, to a considerable extent, the outcome of mediated
communication. Most people do not have direct contact to scientists or scientific
organizations, and do not regularly visit public lectures, science fairs or science
cafes. To a large degree, they derive their knowledge about and image of science
from communication, i.e. from journalistic media such as newspapers or
magazines, TV or radio as well as from online sources and social media [e.g.
BBVA foundation, 2011; National Science Board, 2014]. These sources provide
symbolic indicators which, together with people’s knowledge, values, political
ideologies and identities [e.g. Myers et al., 2016; Roberts et al., 2011], influence their
trust in science.
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Counteracting the
“conceptual
confusion”:
conceptualizing
(mediated) trust
The rising importance of trust has led to a growing number of publications in the
‘science of science communication’ focusing on trust, its antecedents and outcomes
[for an overview see Engdahl and Lidskog, 2014, p. 704]. Most of these publications
are empirical studies, focusing on trust in science in general [e.g. Gauchat, 2011;
Roberts et al., 2011], on research fields like environmental [Brewer and Ley, 2013]
and climate science [Hmielowski et al., 2014; Myers et al., 2016], or on scientific
applications like genetically modified food [Einsiedel, 2002; Marques, Critchley
and Walshe, 2015].
But so far, conceptual works on trust are lacking. A “conceptual confusion” [Lewis
and Weigert, 1985, p. 975] still lingers, as “few researchers have been interested in
the fundamental character of trust”, and therefore, “the concept need[s] further
elaboration“ [Engdahl and Lidskog, 2014].
I will use an understanding mainly developed by sociologists. They define trust “as
the ego’s acceptance of dependency on the outer world or the alter in the absence of
information about the outer world or the alter’s reliability, in order to create an
otherwise impossible outcome” [Engdahl and Lidskog, 2014, p. 710]. Trust, in this
view, is “relational, emotional, asymmetrical, and anticipatory“ [Engdahl and
Lidskog, 2014, p. 713], an enumeration that will be unpacked here in reverse order:
– Trust is anticipatory, firstly, because it “is a bet about the future contingent
actions of others” [Sztompka, 1999, p. 25]. It is useful in situations where an
individual actor — ego — cannot fully forecast the actions of relevant others
— the alteri — yet still has to rely on them [Bentele, 1994, p. 141; Kohring,
2001]. If ego can trust alter in such a situation, he or she is enabled to act [cf.
Luhmann, 2000].
– Secondly, trust is asymmetrical. It is built on an “acceptance of dependency”
[Barbalet, 2009, p. 368ff; Engdahl and Lidskog, 2014, p. 710f] between givers
and recipients of trust, with the first depending on the latter’s future actions.
Even seemingly mutual trust, in this conception, is understood as “two
separate instances of trust, each of which involves an asymmetrical
relationship” [Engdahl and Lidskog, 2014, p. 711].
– Such an ‘acceptance of dependency’ has a rational component, a conscious
decision by ego to rely on alter. This reflexive side of trust has been
emphasized, for example, by rational choice theorists [e.g. Coleman, 1991;
Gambetta, 1988]. But such a perspective “emphasizes the cognitive-reflexive
aspect of trust at the expense of its emotional aspect” [Engdahl and Lidskog,
2014, p. 713], while trust, thirdly, involves an ego’s confidence in an uncertain
future and, therefore, has an emotional component.
– Trust is, finally, relational, because it eventually refers to the actions of others
[e.g. Coleman, 1982; Luhmann, 2000; Sztompka, 1999]. Analytically, it
consists of the relation between a giver of trust, like a member of the public,
trusting a recipient of trust that can be a person, a group, an organization or
even a social system such as ‘science’, with regards to the recipient’s future
actions [Coleman, 1991; Sztompka, 1999] (see figure 1).
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Figure 1. Schematic model of mediated trust in science [mainly based on Bentele, 1994;
Engdahl and Lidskog, 2014; Kohring, 2001; Kohring, 2004; Luhmann, 2000; Sztompka, 1999].
Trust, in this sense, is a functional equivalent for an ego’s knowledge about, or
control over, an alter’s action. It is important to note that trust, therefore, is not
achieved by ego acquiring more knowledge about alter, or by gaining control over
alter. In sharp contrast, trust is a substitute for knowledge and control [Kohring,
2001]. With regards to trust in science, that means that in situations where members
of the public do not know exactly what science does and have no means of
substantially influencing it, they may (have to) make a “leap of faith” [Engdahl and
Lidskog, 2014, p. 708] and trust science.
This basic constellation between the public and science is further complicated by
trust intermediaries like media. Public trust in science is, to a considerable degree,
influenced by media representations of science, its protagonists and institutions.
Given the detachment of science from society, it can even be argued that media
representations have a stronger impact on public trust in science than on public
trust in the economy, art, religion, or maybe even politics. Newspapers and
magazines, radio, television as well as new media provide “symbolic indicators”
[Bentele, 1994] of science’s trustworthiness upon which public trust in science can
be based. In doing so, trust intermediaries “double” the configuration of trust
[Kohring, 2004, p. 165]: they are themselves potential objects whom the public may
or may not trust [Bentele, 1994, p. 136; see figure 1].
Improving the
measurement of
trust
Along with the underdeveloped conceptual side of trust, its measurements have
been limited. Trust in science is mostly assessed in standardized surveys, where
single questions asking for trust in leaders of the scientific community [e.g.
National Science Board, 2014, p. 7–32f], in scientists as sources of information [e.g.
BBVA foundation, 2011], or in science as a whole serve as indicators.
While such measurements have merits, particularly if they can be compared across
countries or over time, they also should be broadened in several ways. On the one
hand, the various objects of public trust in science should be differentiated. Firstly, and
in line with the general literature on trust which distinguishes trust in persons,
institutions and systems [for an overview see Endress, 2002, p. 53ff], trust in
scientists, scientific institutions as well as in the system of science should be
delineated, and more differentiations, e.g. between disciplines or fields of science,
might be useful. On the other hand, a measurement of mediated trust in science
has to take its multiple objects — namely science and media — into account. It has
to distinguish between both, and should enable researchers to assess the relative
importance of both factors in the production of mediated trust in science.
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Secondly, general measures of trust could be supplemented by multidimensional
measurements of public trust in science. Such approaches have been established in
psychological studies on trust, with recent studies distinguishing three core
dimensions [Hendriks, Kienhues and Bromme, 2015]: “expertise”, i.e. the
competence of scientists, scientific institutions or science; “integrity”, i.e. their
adherence to established scientific standards; and “benevolence”, i.e. the question
whether they have good intentions as seen from the perspective of the public.
Trust in the future:
research
perspectives for
analyzing
mediated trust in
science
Apart from improving concept and measurement, empirical challenges for the
analysis of mediated trust in science exist. Firstly, assessing the determinants of
mediated trust in science is necessary. Scholars of science communication do not yet
know what kinds of media representations effectively trigger trust in science.
Catalogues of potential triggers exist, mentioning, for example, the relevance of
portrayed expertise, of consistency in communication, of a general openness
towards the public or of testimonials by trusted third parties [Bentele, 1994, p. 144f;
Nawratil, 1997] — but they are empirically unproven or focus on trust in objects
other than science. Conceptually, a systematic assessment is necessary which
would have to integrate fields such as “signaling approaches” [Neuberger, 2013,
p. 108], research in credibility [e.g. Metzger and Flanagin, 2013], forensic linguistics
[e.g. Olsson and Luchjenbroers, 2013] and other fields.
Secondly, processes of trust generation require more analysis. Both with regards to
mediated trust in science and to trust in general, long-term processes of
building-up trust have not been investigated [cf. Endress, 2002, p. 53ff; Engdahl
and Lidskog, 2014]. Reconstructing these, and identifying their driving factors,
albeit challenging, would move the field considerably further.
Thirdly, the recent multiplication of the abovementioned constellation of mediated trust
demands scholarly attention. Media as trust intermediaries have always been
heterogeneous, with considerable differences in the extent to which they are trusted
by different publics [e.g. Schäfer, 2012, p. 71]. This heterogeneity is even more
prevalent nowadays on social media: on the one hand, they provide new contexts
for established media content. In social media, articles or news segments on science
are not presented in a vacuum but embedded in a flurry of heuristic cues such as
“likes”, “shares”, comments etc. which may influence how trust indicators are
taken up [cf. Anderson et al., 2014]. On the other hand, social media has made
novel ways of social recommendation possible in which new individuals and
institutions can become opinion leaders [Nisbet and Kotcher, 2009; Schäfer and
Taddicken, 2015] and trust intermediaries [Tsang and Zhou, 2005].
Fourthly, scholars of science communication should focus on the role of distrust in
science. Conceptually, they should discuss whether distrust is ‘just’ a lack of trust,
or a different phenomenon [Hardin, 2004, p. esp. 11ff]. Empirically, the relation
between recent phenomena of pseudoscience and conspiracy theories around
science-related issues like evolution, climate science or vaccination should be
analysed [Engdahl and Lidskog, 2014, p. 703].
In sum, mediated trust in science is becoming more important, while the respective
research still contains considerable gaps. More conceptual work is needed, as well
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as studies aiming specifically for those research gaps. Many of the questions asked
in this commentary are as urgent as they difficult to answer — and I am thankful to
Weingart and Guenther for initiating this discussion.
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